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Shaken Baby Syndrome as Felony Murder in 
North Carolina 
DERICK R. VOLLRATH* 
INTRODUCTION 
In May of 2010, Durham Regional Hospital began a program de-
signed to educate new parents about Shaken Baby Syndrome.1  As part of 
this program, staff members instruct new parents on the dangers of 
shaking a baby and suggest alternative ways parents can attempt to calm 
a seemingly inconsolable child and relieve their own incidental stress.2  
The instruction focuses on what research suggests is the primary reason 
that parents shake their children: parents’ immense frustration with a 
period of inconsolable crying that most children experience between two 
weeks and six months after the child’s birth.3 
The New York City Administration for Children’s Services and the 
New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene also seek to 
educate new parents on the dangers of Shaken Baby Syndrome.4  Litera-
ture indicative of their joint awareness campaign implores parents: “No 
matter how angry or frustrated you feel when your baby or toddler 
 
* Derick Vollrath is an associate at the Raleigh law firm of Tharrington Smith, LLP. 
 1. DRH Program Takes on Shaken Baby Syndrome, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), 
May 12, 2009, at C4 (“Durham Regional Hospital is providing a shaken baby syndrome 
prevention program called ‘The Period of PURPLE Crying’ for patients who deliver at 
Durham Regional.”). 
 2. Id.  The article states: 
The program includes education from Durham Regional postpartum nurses 
who have been trained on Shaken Baby Syndrome, as well as a video and a 
booklet that parents can share with other caregivers of their baby. The program 
describes the hazards of shaking and gives [parents] alternatives to use when 
they feel they need a break from a crying baby. 
Id. 
 3. PERIOD OF PURPLE CRYING, http://www.purplecrying.info/sections/index.php?sct= 
5&sctpg=20&loc=mb1r3p6 (last visited Jan. 26, 2012) (observing that nearly all child-
ren cry more during this period, that most cases of Shaken Baby Syndrome involve child-
ren of this age, and inferring a causal relationship between the two). 
 4. See N.Y.C. ADMIN. FOR CHILDREN’S SERVS. & N.Y.C. DEP’T OF HEALTH & MENTAL 
HYGIENE, TAKE GOOD CARE OF YOUR BABY: WHAT EVERYONE CAN DO, available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/acs/downloads/pdf/child_safety_booklet.pdf. 
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cries—and no matter how much he or she cries—never shake your baby 
or toddler.  Shaking can cause bleeding in the brain that can injure or 
even kill a child.”5 
These awareness campaigns have a clear implication.  They suggest 
that a significant proportion of Shaken Baby Syndrome cases are perpe-
trated by individuals who are either unaware that shaking a baby can kill 
or who are so profoundly frustrated by their circumstances that they fail 
to perceive the consequences of their actions at the time they shake the 
child. 
While public health agencies set out to educate parents on the dan-
gers of shaking babies, District Attorneys’ offices around the nation 
prosecute those who do shake their children.6  In North Carolina, a ca-
regiver who shakes a baby to death can be tried for, and convicted of, 
first-degree murder.7 
Some shaken baby cases truly involve premeditated acts outside 
those contemplated by the myriad Shaken Baby Syndrome awareness 
campaigns.8  Others, however, involve no intent to kill or spring from 
the heat of passion that would ordinarily bring a homicide squarely 
within the definition of manslaughter.9  North Carolina law, however, 
allows all shaken baby cases to be charged as capital crimes.10 
The wisdom of this approach is debatable.  Intent to kill, premedita-
tion, and at the very least, perception of a risk of death are ordinarily 
predicates of a murder conviction.11  However, children present special 
 
 5. Id. at 2 (warning that “[a] crying baby is not ‘bad’ or ‘spoiled’” and “[i]t is a crime 
to shake a baby”). 
 6. See, e.g., State v. Carrilo, 562 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming a convic-
tion of first-degree murder in a baby shaking case). 
 7. See, e.g., id.  But see State v. Barrow, 718 S.E.2d 673 (2011) (upholding a jury’s 
conviction of a defendant for second degree murder in a shaken baby syndrome case in 
which the same jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree murder on the felony murder 
theory discussed infra). 
 8. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 513 S.E.2d 296, 301 (N.C. 1999) (“In September 
1996, defendant was tried capitally and found guilty of first-degree murder on the basis 
of malice, premeditation and deliberation; on the basis of torture; and under the felony 
murder rule.”). 
 9. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 544 (4th ed. 2006) (observ-
ing that “[m]anslaughter is an unlawful killing that does not involve malice afore-
thought” and that “an intentional killing committed in ‘sudden heat of passion’ as the re-
sult of ‘adequate provocation’ is voluntary manslaughter”). 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 543–44 (observing that “[t]he common law definition 
of ‘murder’ is ‘the killing of a human being by another human being with malice afore-
thought” and further observing that “a person who kills another acts with ‘malice’ if she 
2
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cases.  They are vulnerable members of society, ordinarily unable to pro-
tect themselves.12  Moreover, where parents or other caretakers shake 
their children to death in violation of their respective duties, there exists 
a layer of moral opprobrium that the typical murder case lacks.  Both de-
terrent and retributive rationales support punishing shaken baby cases 
more harshly than other homicides committed with a similar mens rea. 
But these considerations do not animate the law that enables North 
Carolina prosecutors to bring first-degree murder charges in shaken ba-
by cases.  The North Carolina General Assembly has not determined that 
homicides involving infants deserve classification as a higher degree of 
murder or that only particularly severe punishment can adequately deter 
those who would otherwise kill a child.13  Instead, prosecutors’ authority 
to bring first-degree murder charges in shaken baby cases derives from 
the idiosyncratic interpretation of North Carolina’s felony murder rule.14 
This Article argues that the North Carolina criminal law’s treatment 
of Shaken Baby Syndrome should be reformed.  Rather than leaving in 
place a legal regime that allows the state to prosecute all Shaken Baby 
Syndrome cases as first-degree murder, the law should distinguish be-
tween accidental and purposeful killings.  If the state wishes to punish 
Shaken Baby Syndrome cases with special severity, the General Assembly 
should make this policy choice explicit. 
In making this argument, this Article proceeds in three parts.  First, 
this Article examines how and why North Carolina subjects all Shaken 
Baby Syndrome deaths to prosecution as first-degree murder.15  Part I 
examines the two rules that, when combined, achieve this result: North 
Carolina’s felony murder rule,16 and the State’s codification of the crime 
 
possesses . . . (1) the intention to kill a human being; (2) the intention to inflict grievous 
bodily injury on another; [or] (3) an extremely reckless disregard for the value of human 
life”). 
 12. See, e.g., State v. Powell, 446 S.E.2d 26, 30–31 (N.C. 1994) (describing children 
as “the most vulnerable persons”). 
 13. North Carolina has made explicit policy choices to categorize some murders as 
more severe than others.  See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2011) (categorizing a murder as 
first-degree where that murder was “perpetrated by means of a nuclear, biological, or 
chemical weapon of mass destruction[,] . . . poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starv-
ing, [or] torture”).  In addition, North Carolina allows for enhanced sentencing with the 
presence of aggravating factors including the victim’s very young age.  Id. § 15A-
1340.16(d)(11); see also State v. Barrow, 718 S.E.2d 673, 676 (N.C. App. 2011) (noting 
that defendant was indicted on aggravating factors because the victim was five months 
old and because defendant “took advantage of a position of trust to commit the offense”). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part I. 
 16. See infra Part I.A. 
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of felonious child abuse.17  Second, this Article digs deeper into the felo-
ny murder doctrine, arguing that North Carolina’s felony murder rule is 
indefensible in the Shaken Baby Syndrome context.  Finally, this Ar-
ticle’s conclusion suggests reform of the way the North Carolina criminal 
law treats Shaken Baby Syndrome cases.18  This Part argues for legislative 
and judicial reform that would limit North Carolina’s felony murder rule 
in child abuse cases.19  If the State wishes killing children to be punished 
more severely than killing an adult, the General Assembly should make 
that policy choice explicit.20  In the absence of such reforms, prosecutors 
should take it upon themselves to exercise sound discretion.  Prosecu-
tors should bring first-degree murder charges only in those Shaken Baby 
Syndrome cases that involve a defendant who acted with the premedi-
tated design to kill or with knowledge that death would result from his 
actions. 
I.  NORTH CAROLINA LAW ALLOWS ALL SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME DEATHS 
TO BE PROSECUTED AS FIRST-DEGREE MURDER 
All Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths in North Carolina can be prose-
cuted as first-degree murder.21  This holds even if the defendant did not 
act with the purpose to kill and if the defendant did not perceive the 
possibility that a child might die as a result of the shaking.  This devia-
tion from the ordinary predicates of a murder conviction in Shaken Baby 
Syndrome cases results not from the North Carolina General Assembly’s 
explicit policy choice that Shaken Baby Syndrome cases present particu-
larly troubling facts, but rather from the idiosyncratic interpretation of 
North Carolina’s felony murder rule and the North Carolina statute de-
fining the crime of felony child abuse.  This Part discusses each of these 
rules in turn. 
 
 17. See infra Part I.B. 
 18. See infra Part III. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Not all Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths are in fact prosecuted as first-degree mur-
der, however.  Some cases are prosecuted as manslaughter.  See, e.g., State v. Evans, 345 
S.E.2d 193 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986) (concerning the appeal of a case in which defendant 
pled to manslaughter for shaking a baby to death). 
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A.  North Carolina’s Felony Murder Rule 
North Carolina’s felony murder rule appears in the section of the 
North Carolina General Statutes that defines first-degree murder.22  After 
defining first-degree murder as “[a] murder which shall be perpetrated 
by means of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruc-
tion[,] . . . poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by 
any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing,” the sta-
tute goes on to set forth the felony murder rule.23  In so doing, the sta-
tute further defines first-degree murder as one that is “committed in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape, or a sex of-
fense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or at-
tempted with the use of a deadly weapon.”24  The requirements for find-
ing a person guilty of first-degree murder under North Carolina’s felony 
murder rule in a Shaken Baby Syndrome case therefore become clear.  As 
a Shaken Baby Syndrome case clearly does not fall under the rubric of 
any of the enumerated felonies, the prosecution must proceed under the 
catchall “other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly 
weapon” language.25  Thus, in order for felony murder to apply, the 
prosecution must prove that the defendant: (1) killed another, (2) in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of (3) a felony committed or at-
tempted with the use of a deadly weapon.26 
1.  The “Use of a Deadly Weapon” Requirement 
At first blush, it would appear that North Carolina’s felony murder 
rule contains language that would limit the rule’s application to Shaken 
Baby Syndrome cases.  Requiring that a would-be felony murderer com-
mit the underlying felony with a deadly weapon seems to remove Shaken 
Baby syndrome from the reach of the felony murder rule.  However, 
North Carolina courts have held that, in certain contexts, an individual’s 
hands can qualify as deadly weapons. 
In State v. Jacobs,27 for example, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals held that a defendant’s fists qualified as “deadly weapons” within 
 
 22. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2011) (defining murder and prescribing its pu-
nishment). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. That is, Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths do not necessarily involve arson, rape, a 
sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, or burglary.  See id. 
 26. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17; State v. Bunch, 689 S.E.2d 866, 870 (N.C. 2010). 
 27. State v. Jacobs, 301 S.E.2d 429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1983). 
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the meaning of the North Carolina statute prohibiting assault with a 
deadly weapon.28  In so holding, the court observed that an item’s status 
as a deadly weapon must be evaluated in light of “the manner in which 
[it was] used and the relative size and condition of the parties.”29  Such 
an item is a deadly weapon if, given these circumstances, the item “‘is 
likely to produce death or great bodily harm.’”30 
Under such a standard, it is not surprising that the North Carolina 
Supreme Court has held that an adult’s hands can constitute deadly 
weapons in Shaken Baby Syndrome cases.31  In State v. Pierce, the North 
Carolina Supreme Court observed, “When a strong or mature person 
makes an attack by hands alone upon a small child, the jury may infer 
that the hands were used as deadly weapons.”32  The Pierce court upheld 
a jury’s determination that a defendant’s hands were deadly weapons 
under North Carolina’s felony murder rule where the defendant was a 
150-pound adult male and the defendant used his hands to shake a two-
and-a-half-year-old child to death.33 
That said, juries do not always find that a defendant used his hands 
as deadly weapons in Shaken Baby Syndrome cases.  In State v. Barrow,34 
for example, the trial court instructed the jury in a Shaken Baby Syn-
drome case that it could convict the defendant of felony murder, second-
degree murder, or manslaughter.35  The jury acquitted the defendant of 
felony murder but convicted him of second-degree murder.36  On appeal, 
the defendant argued that no evidence in the record would support such 
a verdict: either defendant committed felony murder or no murder at 
all.37  The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, observing, “[T]he 
State’s evidence would have permitted the jury to find that defendant did 
 
 28. Id. at 430. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. (quoting State v. Sturdivant, 283 S.E.2d 719, 725 (N.C. 1981)).  In Jacobs, the 
court held that a defendant’s fists were deadly weapons in a case in which the defendant, 
“a thirty-nine year old male who weighed two hundred ten pounds, hit the victim, a sixty 
year old woman, in the head and stomach.”  Id.  The victim suffered brain hemorrhaging 
as a result of her injuries and became unable to care for herself.  Id. 
 31. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (N.C. 1997) (holding that an adult’s 
hands constituted deadly weapons in a Shaken Baby Syndrome case). 
 32. Id. at 589 (citing State v. Eliot, 475 S.E.2d 202, 213 (N.C. 1996); State v. Lang, 
308 S.E.2d 317, 325 (N.C. 1983)). 
 33. Id. 
 34. State v. Barrow, 718 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. App. 2011). 
 35. Id. at 678. 
 36. Id. at 677. 
 37. Id. at 674. 
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not use a deadly weapon but still killed [the victim] with malice . . . .”38  
The Court of Appeals observed that while the law permitted the jury to 
find that a defendant used his hands as a deadly weapon, the law did not 
require it to do so.39 
2.  The Necessary Mens Rea 
North Carolina’s felony murder statute makes no mention of a spe-
cific mental state with which a defendant must act to sustain a convic-
tion for felony murder.40  In State v. Jones,41 however, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court held that to convict a defendant under the felony murder 
rule, the State must prove that the defendant committed the underlying 
felony with some level of intent.42  The court held that a defendant must 
have been “purposely resolved” to commit the “conduct that comprises 
the [underlying] criminal offense.”43 
Jones concerned a defendant who, while driving under the influence 
of alcohol, struck an occupied vehicle.44  The collision resulted in the 
deaths of two teenagers and serious injury to three others.45  One pas-
senger escaped with only minor injuries.46  At trial, the jury convicted 
Jones of four crimes: (1) first-degree murder under the felony murder 
rule; (2) assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury 
(AWDWISI); (3) assault with a deadly weapon (AWDW); and (4) driv-
ing while impaired (DWI).47 
The judge allowed Jones’s conviction of AWDWISI against one of 
the impacted vehicles’ passengers to serve as the predicate felony for the 
murder of another of the impacted vehicle’s passengers.48  Importantly, 
the trial court instructed the jury that felony murder did not require the 
state to prove that the defendant acted with any mental state other than 
that required by the underlying felony.49  With respect to the underlying 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2011) (including no such requirement). 
 41. State v. Jones, 538 S.E.2d 917 (N.C. 2000). 
 42. Id. at 924. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 921. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 922 (“In the instant case, defendant was charged with first-degree murder 
under the felony murder rule based on the underlying felony of AWDWISI.”). 
 49. Id. at 921. 
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AWDWISI charge, the judge instructed the jury that the defendant “may 
be convicted . . . provided there is either an actual intent to inflict injury 
or culpable or criminal negligence from which such intent may be im-
plied.”50 
The North Carolina Supreme Court held that these instructions 
were incomplete and that mere negligence as to the act constituting the 
underlying felony could not sustain a conviction under the felony mur-
der rule.51  In reaching this conclusion, the court considered the way 
North Carolina has treated first-degree murder throughout the state’s 
history.52  The court concluded that a first-degree murder conviction re-
quires “that the defendant had ‘actual intent’ to commit the act that 
forms the basis of a first-degree murder charge.”53 
Importantly, the court held that the intent requirement applies only 
to the conduct that comprises the underlying felony.54  The defendant 
need not act with any particular mental state with respect to the atten-
dant circumstances or the results of the crime that felony murder re-
quires.55  Specifically, a defendant need not know that his conduct is a 
felony,56 and needs to act neither with the purpose of causing a death, 
nor with the knowledge that a death would result from his intended 
conduct.57 
 
 50. Id. at 923. 
 51. Id. at 923–24.  Explaining this holding, the court stated: 
Whether ‘general intent,’ ‘specific intent,’ or ‘malice’ crimes, all of the enume-
rated offenses [in North Carolina’s felony murder rule] require a level of intent 
greater than culpable negligence on the part of the accused.  In short, the ac-
cused must be purposely resolved to commit the underlying crime in order to 
be held accountable for unlawful killings that occur during the crime’s com-
mission. 
Id. at 924. 
 52. Id. (observing that all forms of first-degree murder recognized in North Carolina 
require an actual intent to commit the action resulting in the first-degree murder 
charge).  The court observed that to be convicted of killing by torture, the defendant 
must have intended to torture; and to be convicted of killing someone by firing a gun 
into a building the defendant thought was occupied, the state must prove that the defen-
dant intentionally fired into the building.  Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. (“This is not to imply that an accused must intend to break the law . . . .”). 
 57. Id. (“[T]he actual intent to kill may be present or absent . . . .”). 
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B.  Felony Child Abuse in North Carolina 
North Carolina law outlines many different ways in which a parent 
or other caregiver can commit felony child abuse.  Caregivers commit 
felony child abuse if they permit or encourage their children to partici-
pate in prostitution,58 commit or allow the commission of any sexual act 
upon their children,59 or—either through willful act or grossly negligent 
omission—manifest a reckless disregard for human life resulting in se-
rious injury to the child.60 
Most importantly for the discussion of Shaken Baby Syndrome 
deaths, however, North Carolina law defines as felony child abuse in-
stances in which (1) a parent or caretaker of (2) a child fewer than six-
teen years of age (3) either (a) intentionally inflicts serious physical in-
jury upon the child or (b) intentionally commits an assault upon the 
child which results in serious physical injury to the child.61  The latter 
alternative of the third prong is particularly relevant.  It allows the state 
to convict a caregiver of felony child abuse even if a caregiver intended 
only to assault the child.  The statute does not require the caretaker to 
intend that the assault result in serious physical injury to the child.62 
Establishing intent to commit an assault is not difficult under North 
Carolina law.  North Carolina has not codified the elements of criminal 
assault, and the crime therefore continues to be governed by common 
law.63  The common law defines an assault as “an overt act or an attempt, 
or the unequivocal appearance of an attempt, with force and violence, to 
do some immediate physical injury to the person of another.”64  Further, 
the show of force “must be sufficient to put a person of reasonable firm-
ness in fear of immediate bodily harm.”65 
 
 58. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4(a)(1) (2011). 
 59. Id. § 14-318.4(a)(2). 
 60. Id. §§ 14-318.4(a)(4)–(5). 
 61. See id. § 14-318.4(a) (codifying the laws prohibiting felony child abuse). 
 62. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 646 S.E.2d 613, 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (“[T]he 
element of intent is sufficiently established if a defendant intentionally inflicts injury that 
proves to be serious on a child of less than sixteen years of age in his care. He need not 
specifically intend the injury to be serious.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
State v. Campbell, 340 S.E.2d 474, 476 (N.C. 1986))); see also State v. Capps, No. 
COA09-1011, 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 587, at *13–16 (N.C. Ct. App. Apr. 6, 2010) 
(drawing on Williams and Campbell to reach the same conclusion). 
 63. State v. Crouse, 610 S.E.2d 454, 458 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citation omitted); 
STRONG’S NORTH CAROLINA INDEX Assault & Battery § 15 (4th ed. 2010) (citing State v. 
Hill, 170 S.E.2d 99, 102 (N.C. Ct. App. 1969)). 
 64. Crouse, 610 S.E.2d at 458 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 65. Id. 
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This formulation is misleading, however, because the common law 
establishes a low threshold for the nature of the feared “physical injury” 
or “bodily harm” that an assault must entail.  The North Carolina Su-
preme Court has observed that under the state’s criminal law, every bat-
tery necessarily contains an assault, and that a battery occurs whenever 
“any force is applied, directly or indirectly, to the person of another.”66  A 
slap is sufficient to constitute battery,67 as is an unwanted poke.68 
Shaken Baby Syndrome cases therefore almost uniformly present 
situations in which an assault has occurred.  If the necessary attendant 
circumstances exist,69 and the assault results in serious physical or bodi-
ly injury,70 a defendant will be guilty of felonious child abuse. 
C.  Putting the Two Together 
In light of the North Carolina courts’ interpretation of North Caro-
lina’s felony murder rule and the state’s definition of felony child abuse, 
any homicide resulting from Shaken Baby Syndrome can be prosecuted 
as first-degree felony murder.  To convict a person of felony murder with 
child abuse serving as the predicate felony, the state needs to prove that 
(1) the defendant committed or attempted to commit felonious child 
abuse, (2) the defendant killed the child in the course of committing or 
attempting to commit felonious child abuse, (3) the defendant’s actions 
proximately caused the child’s death, and (4) the act of felony child 
abuse was committed with a deadly weapon.71  To convict a defendant of 
felony child abuse, the state must prove that (1) the defendant was pro-
 
 66. State v. Britt, 154 S.E.2d 519, 521 (N.C. 1967) (emphasis added). 
 67. Id. at 520 (finding sufficient evidence of an assault on a female victim when the 
defendant hit her on the neck and slapped her when she screamed). 
 68. See State v. Bozeman, No. COA04-1063, 2005 N.C. App. LEXIS 2025, at *10–11 
(N.C. Ct. App. Sept. 20, 2005) (upholding a conviction for assault on a female where 
“the State presented the testimony . . . that defendant had poked [the female victim], 
clearly applying force to her person”). 
 69. That is, the victim is under the age of sixteen and the defendant is the victim’s 
caregiver.  N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-318.4(a) (2011) (codifying these attendant circums-
tances as elements of the offense). 
 70. If the assault results in serious physical injury, defendant will be guilty of a class 
E felony.  Id.  If the assault results in serious bodily injury or protracted or permanent 
loss or impairment of any mental or emotional function of the child, the defendant will 
be guilty of a class C felony.  Id. § 14-318.4(a3).  A serious physical injury is one that 
causes “great pain and suffering” including serious mental injury.  Id. § 14-318.4(d)(2).  
A serious bodily injury is one that creates substantial risk of death, causes permanent 
injuries, or results in prolonged hospitalization.  Id. § 14-318.4(d)(1). 
 71. See NORTH CAROLINA PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR CRIMINAL CASES § 206.15 
(2002) (providing form jury instructions for felony murder). 
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viding care to the child; (2) the child was under sixteen years of age; (3) 
the defendant (a) intentionally assaulted the child, (b) the child suffered 
serious injury, and (c) the assault proximately caused the injury.72 
A typical Shaken Baby Syndrome homicide meets these require-
ments.  It is assumed within the definition of a Shaken Baby Syndrome 
case that a parent or other caretaker has shaken a small child.  Even if a 
caregiver shook the child out of sheer passionate frustration or without 
understanding the potential consequences of his or her actions, the care-
giver will have intended to undertake the act of shaking the child.  In 
cases involving a large defendant and an infant child, the jury may infer 
that the defendant used his or her hands as deadly weapons.  A serious 
injury necessarily precedes the victim’s eventual death.  All elements of a 
felony murder conviction present themselves in a Shaken Baby Syn-
drome case. 
Of importance to North Carolina’s treatment of Shaken Baby Syn-
drome homicides is that North Carolina’s “merger doctrine” appears not 
to apply to felonious child abuse.  The merger doctrine limits the felony 
murder rule in most jurisdictions.73  In jurisdictions that recognize the 
merger doctrine, the felony murder rule only applies if the predicate fe-
lony is collateral to or independent of the homicide.74  The underlying 
felony must have been undertaken “with a collateral and independent fe-
lonious design separate from the intent to inflict the injury that caused 
the death.”75  To adopt a contrary rule would render every felonious 
death a first-degree murder and destroy the crimes of manslaughter and 
negligent homicide.76 
North Carolina’s Supreme Court appears to have adopted the mer-
ger doctrine only reluctantly and in a limited capacity.  In a footnote to 
 
 72. See id. § 239.55 (2005). 
 73. See State v. King, 340 S.E.2d 71, 73–74 (N.C. 1986) (observing that North Caro-
lina has never adopted the merger doctrine and declining to do so in that case).  For an 
example of the merger doctrine in action, see Edge v. State, 414 S.E.2d 463, 464 (Ga. 
1992).  In Edge, the state of Georgia applied a modified version of the merger doctrine to 
limit liability for felony murder where the underlying felony formed an integral part of 
the conduct that resulted in the death and where circumstances would otherwise warrant 
a mitigation of the homicide to mere manslaughter.  Id. 
 74. DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 563. 
 75. Id. at 565 (quoting People v. Hansen, 885 P.2d 1022, 1029 (Cal. 1994)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 76. Id. at 564 (“[A] felony murder rule without some form of independent-felony 
limitation would effectively destroy the distinctions set up by legislatures between first- 
and second-degree murder and manslaughter.”). 
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its opinion in State v. Jones,77 the North Carolina Supreme Court sug-
gested in dicta that while North Carolina has rejected the merger doc-
trine where an assault on one victim causes the death of another, “cases 
involving a single assault victim who dies of his injuries have never been 
similarly constrained.”78  The court continues, declaring that “in such 
cases, the assault on the victim cannot be used as an underlying felony 
for purposes of the felony murder rule.”79  In so stating, the court 
adopted the prevailing rationale that to allow an assault or other felony 
perpetrated against one victim to serve as a predicate for a felony murder 
charge for the death of the same victim would effectively undo the Gen-
eral Assembly’s codification of lesser homicides.80 
However, other language in the Jones opinion and subsequent hold-
ings by the North Carolina Supreme Court and Court of Appeals reveals 
that the court did not adopt the merger doctrine wholesale.  In Jones, the 
court stated that a defendant would be subject to a felony murder con-
viction where he fired a weapon into an occupied building (a felony in 
North Carolina) and that action resulted in a death.81  The court so 
stated even though this rule converts a classic second-degree murder 
perpetrated in wanton and reckless disregard for human life into a first-
degree felony murder based on conduct inextricably bound up in the 
commission of the second-degree murder.82  It is difficult to see how the 
two felonies (the murder and the discharging of a firearm into an occu-
pied building) were perpetrated with the independent felonious design 
that the merger doctrine typically requires. 
Further, the North Carolina Supreme Court has distinguished cases 
in which a series of assaults culminate in a death.  In State v. Caroll,83 for 
example, the defendant attacked his victim with a machete and then 
strangled her to death.84  The court held that the attack with the machete 
and the act of strangulation constituted two separate assaults and that 
 
 77. See supra Part I.A.2 and accompanying text. 
 78. State v. Jones, 538 S.E.2d 917, 926 n.3 (N.C. 2000). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 925. 
 82. Cf. State v. Prouse, 767 P.2d 1308, 1313 (Kan. 1989) (defining Kansas’s merger 
doctrine to preclude a felony murder conviction where the conduct that constitutes the 
underlying felony also constitutes the act that caused the death); Quillen v. State, 163 
P.3d 587 (Okla. Ct. Crim. App. 2007) (defining Oklahoma’s merger doctrine similarly).  
Note that Kansas has since converted its merger doctrine to cover felonies that are lesser-
included offenses of the homicide.  State v. Rayton, 1 P.3d 854, 864 (Kan. 2000). 
 83. State v. Caroll, 573 S.E.2d 899 (N.C. 2002). 
 84. Id. at 903–04. 
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the machete attack could serve as the underlying felony for a felony 
murder charge based upon the death by strangulation.85 
Although North Carolina’s adoption of the merger doctrine has 
been muddled and piecemeal, it appears clear that the rule does not 
preclude felony child abuse from undergirding a felony murder convic-
tion.  In the same Jones opinion in which the court articulated North 
Carolina’s merger doctrine, the court observed that felony child abuse 
could support a felony murder conviction.86  Further, in the 2003 case, 
State v. Stokes,87 the court affirmed a defendants’ conviction for felony 
murder in a case in which felony child abuse was offered as the predicate 
felony.88  While Stokes did not explicitly confront the issue of whether 
felony child abuse can serve as the predicate felony for a felony murder 
charge, the court expressed no reservations on this score.89 
North Carolina’s version of the felony murder rule and the state’s 
codification of felony child abuse operate to elevate every fatal case of 
Shaken Baby Syndrome to the status of a first-degree murder.  While 
North Carolina’s felony murder rule limits felony murder to crimes in-
volving the use of a deadly weapon, North Carolina’s courts consistently 
hold that a jury can find a defendant’s hands to be deadly weapons 
where the defendants are much larger than their victims.  While North 
Carolina’s felony murder rule requires that a defendant intentionally 
commit the underlying felony, the slightest battery more than satisfies 
this requirement in felony child abuse cases.  North Carolina’s version of 
the merger doctrine does not prohibit felony child abuse from underly-
ing a felony murder charge. 
This treatment does not result from the North Carolina General As-
sembly’s explicit policy choice to punish Shaken Baby Syndrome cases 
particularly harshly.  Rather, it results from a series of idiosyncratic in-
terpretations of North Carolina’s felony murder rule. 
 
 85. Id. at 906.  This result is questionable in light of North Carolina’s requirement 
that the death occur during the course of the felony underlying a felony murder convic-
tion. 
 86. Jones, 538 S.E.2d at 925 (“Specific crimes that have qualified as an underlying 
felony . . . include . . . felonious child abuse.” (citing State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576 (N.C. 
1997))). 
 87. State v. Stokes, 581 S.E.2d 51 (N.C. 2003). 
 88. Id. at 56; see also State v. Carrilo, 562 S.E.2d 47 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) (affirming 
a conviction for felony murder with child abuse serving as the underlying felony). 
 89. See Stokes, 581 S.E.2d at 56. 
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II. THE FELONY MURDER DOCTRINE: NATIONAL BACKGROUND 
The national debate surrounding the felony murder doctrine may 
further illustrate the peculiarities and shortcomings of North Carolina’s 
version of the rule, especially as it applies to Shaken Baby Syndrome cas-
es.  The felony murder rule is a controversial doctrine with no shortage 
of detractors.90  Those who disfavor the rule argue that it fails to corre-
late the grade of an offense with a defendant’s culpability and achieves 
no deterrent purpose.91  Supporters of the doctrine argue that this is not 
always true and that the felony murder rule has valid expressive value.92  
This Part describes the leading objections to and arguments in support 
of the felony murder rule.  It then argues that North Carolina’s felony 
murder rule, as applied to Shaken Baby Syndrome cases, would not satis-
fy even those who defend the felony murder doctrine.93 
A.  Against the Felony Murder Rule 
The vast majority of criminal law scholars disfavor the felony mur-
der rule.94  These scholars evaluate the felony murder rule in light of the 
traditional aims of the criminal justice system: retribution for and deter-
rence of socially undesirable and morally wrong actions.95 
 
 90. See, e.g., SAMUEL H. PILLSBURY, JUDGING EVIL: RETHINKING THE LAW OF MURDER AND 
MANSLAUGHTER 106–08 (1998); Guyora Binder, The Culpability of Felony Murder, 83 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 965, 966 (2008) [hereinafter Binder, Culpability] (“Legal scholars 
are almost unanimous in condemning felony murder as a morally indefensible form of 
strict liability.” (citing MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 6 (Official Draft and Revised 
Comments 1985))); see also David Crump, Reconsidering the Felony Murder Rule in Light 
of Modern Criticisms: Doesn’t the Conclusion Depend upon the Particular Rule at Issue?, 32 
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1155 (2009). 
 91. See infra Part II.A. 
 92. See id. 
 93. See infra Part II.B. 
 94. See, e.g., Binder, Culpability, supra note 90, at 966 (“Most criminal law scholars 
have assumed there is nothing to say on behalf of the felony murder doctrine, no way to 
rationalize its rules to the lawyers who will apply it, and no reforms worth urging on 
courts and legislatures short of its utter abolition.”). 
 95. See Crump, supra note 90, at 1160 (observing that opponents of the felony mur-
der rule argue that the felony murder rule fails to capture the moral blameworthiness of 
criminal defendants and that “classic arguments [against the felony murder rule] also 
assert that the felony murder rule cannot advance other goals of the criminal law, includ-
ing those founded on utilitarian concepts such as deterrence”). 
14
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1.  Failure to Correlate with a Defendant’s Culpability  
Most modern criticism of the felony murder rule revolves around 
retributive rationales.96  Professor James Tomkovicz, for example, ob-
serves that modern sensibilities demand that criminal liability correlate 
to an individual defendant’s culpability or “mental fault.”97  Where the 
felony murder rule allows the state to convict a defendant for an acci-
dental killing, the law is “disloyal to the principle that some level of 
mental fault is required for each essential element” of a crime.98 
2.  Lack of Deterrent Value  
Other critiques of the felony murder doctrine focus on the rule’s de-
terrent value.  In her influential student note,99 Jeanne Hall Seibold ar-
gues that the felony murder rule cannot possibly achieve deterrent ends 
because accidental and negligent actions cannot be deterred.100  Working 
from the additional premise that felony murder covers primarily acci-
dental and negligent killings, Seibold concludes that the felony murder 
rule has no deterrent value.101  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. also 
offered this criticism of the felony murder doctrine.102  Additionally, 
Holmes argued that felons will not be deterred from accidentally killing 
in furtherance of a homicide because felons are unlikely to know the ni-
 
 96. See James J. Tomkovicz, The Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the 
Forces that Shape Our Criminal Law, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1429, 1441 (1994) (“[T]he 
major complaint about the felony-murder rule is that it violates generally accepted prin-
ciples of culpability.”). 
 97. Id. at 1437 (“The third aspect of modern scholarly thought that is implicit in 
some of the foregoing is the demand for liability proportionate to culpability.”). 
 98. Id. at 1439. 
 99. Jeanne Hall Seibold, Note, The Felony-Murder Rule: In Search of a Viable Doctrine, 
23 CATH. LAW.133 (1978).  According to a recent search in WestLaw’s law journal and 
treatise database, Seibold’s note has been cited at least 19 times.  Citations include ar-
ticles in the Yale Law Journal and the Stanford Law Review.  See Guyora Binder, The Ori-
gins of American Felony Murder Rules, 57 STAN. L. REV. 59 (2004) [hereinafter Binder, 
Origins]; Paul H. Robinson, Imputed Criminal Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 609 (1984). 
 100. See Seibold, supra note 99, at 151 (citing Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should 
be Excluded From Penal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 632, 642 (1963)). 
 101. See id. (observing that “[s]ince neither negligence nor accident can be deterred” 
the felony murder does not serve a deterrent purpose).  This argument is wrongheaded, 
however: strict and negligent liability have definite deterrent effects. 
 102. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 58 (Little, Brown, & Co. 
1881). 
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ceties of the felony murder rule and therefore the rule will not factor in-
to a felon’s decision-making process.103 
3.  Constitutionality and Fairness  
Still other commentators take issue with the rule’s constitutionality 
and its implications for procedural fairness.  They argue that under some 
formulations of the doctrine, the felony murder rule creates a presump-
tion as to an element of a criminal offense and that this presumption vi-
olates the Constitution’s requirement that a state prove all elements of a 
crime beyond a reasonable doubt.104  Alternatively, avoiding a mens rea 
presumption by formulating the felony murder rule as truly a strict lia-
bility offense raises other Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clause 
concerns.105  Even if these moves do not run afoul of the Constitution, 
they amount to short cuts whereby prosecutors can achieve convictions 
without proving elements that homicide laws would otherwise re-
quire.106 
B.  In Support of the Felony Murder Rule 
While most scholars reject the felony murder doctrine as failing ei-
ther to correlate with a defendant’s culpability or to effectively deter ho-
micides, the doctrine does have some supporters.107  Those who support 
the doctrine aver that the rule’s detractors argue against a straw man—a 
caricature of the rule that hasn’t existed for decades,108 if it ever existed 
 
 103. See id.; see also Crump, supra note 90, at 1160 (commenting on the criticism 
Holmes leveled along these lines). 
 104. See Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at 
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446, 460–61 (1985). 
 105. Id. at 478–79 (citing Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788–801 (1982), for the 
proposition that assigning heavy criminal liability for a crime that lacks a mens rea com-
ponent might cross the threshold of constitutionality). 
 106. See, e.g., Seibold, supra note 99, at 157 (“Significant procedural advantages can 
be gained by predicating an indictment on felony-murder rather than, or in the alterna-
tive with, intentional murder.”). 
 107. See, e.g., David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In Defense of the Felony Murder 
Doctrine, 8 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 359 (1985) (defending the felony murder doctrine); 
Binder, Culpability, supra note 90, at 967 (attempting to provide “the long-missing prin-
cipled defense of the felony murder doctrine”). 
 108. See Binder, Culpability, supra note 90, at 969 (arguing that one of the “two main 
reasons” that criminal law theorists dismiss the felony murder rule as irrational “is a dis-
torted picture of felony murder liability as imposing strict liability for accidental death in 
the course of all felonies”).  Professor David Crump alludes to this phenomenon in his 
argument that the validity of critiques of the felony murder rule depends on the particu-
16
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at all.109  In fact, they argue, the felony murder rule is subject to several 
kinds of limitations and exceptions that ensure that the law captures on-
ly morally culpable offenders. 
Professor David Crump is probably the foremost defender of the fe-
lony murder doctrine, at least in some incarnations.  In his most recent 
article on the subject, Crump observes that the felony murder rule is a 
longstanding feature of state law, and consequently has evolved diffe-
rently in each jurisdiction.110  As of 2006, for example, Missouri had 
opted for a broad interpretation of the rule,111 while Hawaii, Kansas, and 
Michigan have done away with the rule completely.112  Other states have 
limited the applicability of the felony murder rule in different ways.  
Crump argues that the validity of any criticism of the rule depends on 
the particular version of the rule in question.113  Some formulations of 
the felony murder rule achieve a just and reasonable result.  Others do 
not. 
Crump offers California’s felony murder doctrine as an example of a 
flawed version of the rule.114  California’ s felony murder rule is primari-
ly a judicial doctrine, born out of judicial interpretation of the concept of 
malice written into California’s murder statute.115  California’s felony 
murder rule is primarily limited by a requirement that the felony under-
lying a felony murder conviction be “inherently dangerous.”116  This test 
 
lar version of the felony murder rule in question.  See generally Crump, supra note 90; 
see also Tomkovicz, supra note 96, at 1430 (beginning a critical discussion of the felony 
murder rule by observing that “[i]n its classic form, the operation of the rule follows a 
compellingly simple, almost mathematical, logic: a felony + a killing = a murder”). 
 109. See Binder, Origins, supra note 99, at 60 (“Much of the criticism is directed at a 
sweeping doctrine holding felons strictly liable for any death resulting from any felo-
ny.”).  Binder argues that the conventional understanding that American law received a 
broad version of the felony murder doctrine from the English common law at the time of 
American independence is a myth.  See generally id. 
 110. See Crump, supra note 90, at 1156–57. 
 111. See DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 563 n.141 (observing that Missouri courts have 
held that the “any felony” language in that state’s felony murder statute precludes appli-
cation of the merger doctrine). 
 112. See id. at 557 n.110 (“The rule is not recognized by statute in Hawaii, . . . Ken-
tucky, . . . and Michigan . . . .” (citations omitted)). 
 113. Crump, supra note 90, at 1178. 
 114. Id. at 1161 (“The California jurisprudence on felony murder, for example, is 
poorly designed.” (citing Stephen L. Miller, Comment, People v. Dillon: Felony Murder in 
California, 21 CAL. W. L. REV. 546, 549–51 (1985))). 
 115. See id. at 1171 n.74 (citing David Crump, “Murder Pennsylvania Style”: Compar-
ing Traditional American Homicide Law to the Statutes of Model Penal Code Jurisdictions, 
109 W. VA. L. REV. 257, 305–12 (2007)). 
 116. Id. at 1171 (citing People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361, 1367 (Cal. 1971)). 
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does not look to the individual defendant’s conduct in the course of 
committing the felony, but rather asks whether the felony itself is capa-
ble of being committed in a non-dangerous manner.117 
This rule has proved better at testing the judicial imagination than 
the culpability of a defendant’s conduct.  California’s courts have been 
able to hypothesize safe ways to commit the crimes of practicing medi-
cine without a license under conditions creating a great risk of bodily 
harm, serious physical or mental illness, or death; false imprisonment by 
violence, menace, fraud, or deceit; possession of a sawed-off shotgun; ex-
tortion; and child endangerment or abuse.118  These felonies therefore 
cannot serve as predicates to a felony murder conviction.  California 
courts have not thought of similarly safe ways to commit the crimes of 
manufacturing methamphetamine, kidnapping, arson of a motor vehicle, 
or grossly negligent discharge of a firearm.119  These felonies therefore 
can give rise to felony murder liability. 
Crump argues that California’s decisions as to what felonies can 
underlie a felony murder conviction are arbitrary.120  Further, the “inhe-
rent” dangerousness of a felony bears little necessary relationship to the 
defendant’s actual conduct in the course of committing that felony.  Con-
sequently, California’s felony murder rule does a poor job aligning pu-
nishment for a homicide with a defendant’s culpability, and is therefore 
vulnerable to criticism on these grounds.121 
Crump argues that while California’s felony murder doctrine fails to 
correlate with a defendant’s culpability, other versions of the rule do a 
better job.  He offers Texas’s felony murder statute as an example of a 
well-formulated felony murder rule.  According to Texas’s felony murder 
rule, defendants commit felony murder if they (1) commit or attempt to 
commit a felony other than manslaughter, and (2) in the course of and 
in furtherance of or in immediate flight from the commission of the of-
fense, they (3) commit or attempt to commit an act clearly dangerous to 
human life that (4) causes the death of an individual.122  The require-
ment that a defendant commit or attempt an act clearly dangerous to 
human life ties Texas’s felony murder rule to a defendant’s individual 
 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 1172 (quoting People v. Howard, 104 P.3d 107, 111–12 (Cal. 2005)). 
 119. Id. (quoting Howard, 104 P.3d at 111–12). 
 120. See id. (“[T]he list of felonies that the California court has found to be ‘inherently 
dangerous’ looks completely arbitrary when compared with the list of felonies that it has 
found not to be ‘inherently dangerous’ . . . .”). 
 121. See id. at 1173 (“[T]he California rule gives the appearance of a disconnect be-
tween moral blameworthiness and crime definition.”). 
 122. Id. at 1166 (quoting TEX. PENAL CODE § 19.02(b)(3) (2008)). 
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culpability.123  Crump argues that this rule is likely good enough, but 
observes that it can still be improved by adding language that would re-
quire a defendant to have intentionally committed the underlying felony 
and that the defendant intentionally commit an act that he knows to be 
clearly dangerous to human life.124 
Professor Guyora Binder also provides a defense of the felony mur-
der rule.  He argues that, subject to other appropriate limitations,125 felo-
ny murder liability is deserved where a defendant acts with “an addition-
al malign purpose independent of injury to the victim killed.”126  Binder 
would go as far as to allow a conviction for felony murder even if a crim-
inal defendant committed the underlying felony only negligently, so long 
as the state proved that the defendant acted with this additional malign 
purpose.127  Binder justifies this conclusion by observing that “the felon’s 
additional depraved purpose aggravates his culpability for causing a 
death carelessly.”128 
C.  North Carolina’s Felony Murder Rule in Light of These Argument 
Those opposed to felony murder liability in general129 will find 
nothing favorable about North Carolina’s felony murder rule.  As with 
other versions of the felony murder rule, North Carolina’s allows a de-
fendant to be convicted of murder even if a defendant did not act with a 
premeditated intent to kill.130  In fact, North Carolina’s felony murder 
rule may attract greater derision on these grounds, as it converts a killing 
 
 123. See id. (“[T]his statute is a good law because it ties the crime of murder to rela-
tively high degrees of individual blameworthiness.”). 
 124. See id. at 1169 (observing that “the statute . . . could be improved if it were 
amended to include additional language”).  But see id. at 1170 (“Extra words in a jury 
charge cause confusion, of course, and in this instance it seems doubtful that the value of 
the extra words is worth it.”). 
 125. Binder suggests limitations different from those offered by Crump.  Specifically, 
Binder argues that the rule should only apply where a defendant attempts felonies inhe-
rently involving violence or destruction.  Binder, Culpability, supra note 90, at 967.  
Crump would likely object to this limitation based on the difficulty the California courts 
have had defining similar language.  See Crump, supra note 90, at 1171–73. 
 126. Binder, Culpability, supra note 90, at 967. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See supra Part II.A. 
 130. See State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (N.C. 1997) (“Felony murder . . . does 
not require the State to prove any specific intent on the part of the accused.”). 
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in the course of a felony into murder in the first-degree,131 even though a 
second-degree murder conviction is the usual outcome in other jurisdic-
tions.132 
1.  The North Carolina Felony Murder Rule Lacks an “Inherently 
Dangerous Act” Requirement 
Even those who support felony murder liability in the abstract,133 
however, may find North Carolina’s felony murder rule objectionable.  
As Professor Crump observes, a well constructed felony murder rule can 
hue to a defendant’s moral culpability if the rule requires the state to 
prove that a defendant undertook a particularly dangerous act in the 
course of committing the underlying felony.134  This requirement limits 
liability to instances in which a defendant acted with a careless disregard 
for the potential consequences of his actions.  North Carolina’s rule 
nearly imposes such a requirement by requiring that the state prove that 
a defendant committed the underlying felony with a deadly weapon. 
If this deadly weapon requirement were given its colloquial mean-
ing, it would go a long way towards restricting the felony murder rule to 
instances in which a defendant acted with true culpability.  Engaging a 
deadly weapon dramatically raises the stakes of a felonious act.  Addi-
tionally, the planning incumbent in bringing a deadly weapon to the 
scene of a felony implies at least some minimal degree of preparation, 
and therefore knowledge or intent, on the part of the defendant.  Put 
another way, the defendant knowingly and intentionally brought the 
weapon to a scene of a felony, and either knew or should have known 
that this made the possibility of a death in the course of the felony much 
more likely.  The reckless disregard for the safety of others manifest in 
employing a deadly weapon, as the term is colloquially understood, 
combined with a defendant’s malign purpose of using the deadly weapon 
to further the underlying felony, may give rise to a degree of moral cul-
pability equivalent to premeditated murder. 
 
 131. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2011) (“A murder . . . which shall be committed in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of any . . . other felony committed or attempted 
with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree . . . .”). 
 132. See DRESSLER, supra note 9, at 557 (observing that according to most modern 
murder statutes, “[i]f a death results from the commission of an unspecified felony, it is 
second-degree murder”). 
 133. See supra Part II.B. 
 134. See Crump, supra note 90, at 1166 (observing that a statute with such a require-
ment “is a good law because it ties the crime of murder to relatively high degrees of indi-
vidual blameworthiness”). 
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Despite this limiting language, North Carolina courts have ham-
pered the effectiveness that the language may have had through their 
application of the felony murder rule.  North Carolina courts have held 
that whether an object is a deadly weapon depends not upon the object’s 
inherent purpose or design, but rather on the manner in which the de-
fendant used the object and the circumstances surrounding its use.135  
Consequently, North Carolina courts have held several everyday objects 
to be deadly weapons, including cars136 and belts.137  Moreover, in hold-
ing that hands can constitute deadly weapons for the purposes of the fe-
lony murder rule,138 North Carolina courts have held that a deadly wea-
pon need not be an object independent from the defendant’s own body. 
That said, the North Carolina Court of Appeals might have breathed 
new life into the deadly weapon requirement with its recent opinion in 
State v. Barrow.139  That case concerned a defendant accused of shaking 
his child in a manner that resulted in the child’s eventual death.140  At 
trial, the jury acquitted the defendant of first-degree felony murder and 
instead convicted the defendant of second-degree murder under a tradi-
tional malice theory.141  Upholding the verdict as supported by the evi-
dence, a divided panel of the North Carolina Court of Appeals observed 
that the jury could have determined that the defendant shook the child 
to death with his hands, but that the defendant did not use his hands as 
deadly weapons when he did so.142 
In so holding, the Court of Appeals offered no guidance as to 
when—in the Shaken Baby Syndrome context—a jury should find that a 
defendant used his hands as a deadly weapon and when the jury should 
not.143  Perhaps more importantly, the court did not address why this 
 
 135. See supra Part I.A.1. 
 136. State v. Jones, 538 S.E.2d 917, 922 (N.C. 2000) (“It is well settled in North Caro-
lina that an automobile can be a deadly weapon if it is driven in a reckless or dangerous 
manner.”). 
 137. See State v. Walden, 293 S.E.2d 780 (N.C. 1982) (allowing a belt to serve as a 
deadly weapon for a charge of assault with a deadly weapon). 
 138. See, e.g., State v. Pierce, 488 S.E.2d 576, 589 (N.C. 1997) (allowing fists to serve 
as a deadly weapon in a felony murder charge). 
 139. State v. Barrow, 718 S.E.2d 673 (N.C. App. 2011). 
 140. Id. at 676. 
 141. Id. at 677. 
 142. Id. at 678. 
 143. See id.  At least one Court of Appeals judge found the majority’s position untena-
ble.  Id. at 681 (Elmore, J., dissenting).  Judge Elmore’s dissent has formed the basis of 
the defendant’s appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court.  The case is currently 
pending. 
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opaque analysis should form the line between a presumptive twelve-year 
prison term and exposure to the death penalty.144 
However, the courts could provide content to this analysis that 
could meaningfully distinguish between defendants based upon their re-
spective culpability.  In keeping with Crump’s analysis above, the Appel-
late Division could hold that a defendant uses his hands—or any other 
everyday object—as deadly weapons if he intentionally uses them in 
such a manner that he actually knows is clearly dangerous to human life. 
2.  North Carolina Fails to Require that a Defendant Act with an 
Independent Malign Intent  
Further, even proponents of felony murder liability generally might 
object to North Carolina’s muddled application of the merger doctrine.  
As Professor Binder has observed, liability for felony murder is appropri-
ate in instances in which a defendant’s malign intent to commit a felony 
aggravates a defendant’s culpability for causing a death (whether negli-
gently or recklessly) in the course of committing that felony.145  Society 
condemns someone who negligently kills during the course of a rape 
more severely than it does someone who negligently kills while speeding 
down a highway in an effort to arrive at work on time.146  North Caroli-
na’s merger doctrine—particularly as applied to child abuse cases—does 
not require that a defendant act with any additional malign purpose 
beyond causing the injury that results in a death.147 
CONCLUSION 
Society appears to send mixed messages concerning the blamewor-
thiness of Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths.  Hospitals, public health advo-
cacy groups, and even some state agencies treat Shaken Baby Syndrome 
as a preventable phenomenon, arising not from malice but from ignor-
 
 144. See id. at 678–79. 
 145. See Binder, Culpability, supra note 90, at 967 (articulating this justification for 
the felony murder doctrine). 
 146. See id. at 968.  Binder suggests: 
[F]elony murder liability rests on a simple and powerful idea: that the guilt in-
curred in attacking or endangering others depends on one’s reasons for doing 
so.  Killing to prevent a rape is justifiable, while killing to avenge a rape is not.  
And yet killing to redress a verbal insult is worse, and killing to enable a rape 
worse still.  Even when inflicting harm is wrong, a good motive can mitigate 
that wrong and a bad motive can aggravate it. 
Id. 
 147. See supra Part I.C. 
22
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 34, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol34/iss2/4
VOLLRATH FINAL 3/23/2012  2:31 PM 
2012] SHAKEN BABY SYNDROME AS FELONY MURDER 445 
ance.148  They implore parents to never shake a baby and seek to help 
parents understand that a baby’s inconsolable shrieks and tears are nor-
mal, and that things will improve with time.149  These campaigns share a 
common assumption: a significant number of Shaken Baby Syndrome 
deaths are not the intended result of a caregiver’s premeditated design.150  
Caregivers just lose it.  They snap.  They don’t know any better. 
At the same time, North Carolina’s criminal law allows the state’s 
district attorneys to prosecute these caregivers for first-degree murder, 
the most serious criminal charge available.151 
This result is not indefensible.  Small children are a particularly 
vulnerable population.  The state may legitimately levy harsh punish-
ments against those who kill children, even accidentally, in an effort to 
deter those killings as strongly as possible.  Additionally, when a care-
giver kills a child, he or she breaches profound duties that add a layer of 
moral culpability that is not found in other homicide cases. 
However, compelling arguments can also be advanced against the 
North Carolina criminal law’s treatment of Shaken Baby Syndrome 
deaths.  The law ordinarily distinguishes homicides based upon the 
mental state of the perpetrator.  A deliberate, premeditated homicide has 
always been considered more inherently blameworthy than an accidental 
homicide, or a homicide intentionally committed in the sudden heat of 
passion.  The fact that Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths involve a children 
does not mean that these distinctions should be discarded. 
Ultimately, whether North Carolina’s criminal law punishes Shaken 
Baby Syndrome deaths appropriately is a normative question that could 
be argued either way.  However, North Carolina’s treatment of Shaken 
Baby Syndrome deaths does not result from the evaluation of the com-
peting considerations discussed above.  Instead, North Carolina’s treat-
ment of Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths results from peculiar features of 
the state’s felony murder rule and the statute codifying felony child 
abuse. 
The state provides for no sanction more serious than a conviction 
for first-degree murder.  North Carolina’s General Assembly should not 
allow the law to impose it based on a technicality and historical accident.  
The Assembly should amend North Carolina’s felony murder rule to 
preclude uniform liability for first-degree murder for Shaken Baby Syn-
drome deaths. 
 
 148. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text. 
 149. See id. 
 150. See supra notes 5–6 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra notes 6–7 and accompanying text. 
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This Article has suggested ways in which the General Assembly 
could accomplish this aim.  For example, the Assembly could amend the 
felony murder rule to require that a defendant commit an act that the de-
fendant knows and perceives at the time to be dangerous to human 
life.152 
The Assembly could provide a statutory definition of a “deadly wea-
pon” in the felony murder context.153  The amendment could, for exam-
ple, define the term to exclude a person’s hands, or to exclude objects 
commonly used for a benign purpose and conveyed to the scene of a fe-
lony with that benign purpose.  Such a definition would better approx-
imate situations in which a defendant intended conduct that the defen-
dant knew or should have known would lead to an increased risk of 
death. 
Alternatively, either the General Assembly or the judiciary could 
define a “deadly weapon” to include only articles that the defendant in-
tended to use in a manner he knew to be clearly dangerous to human 
life. 
Further, either the General Assembly or the North Carolina courts 
should further the state’s adoption of the merger limitation on felony 
murder liability.154  Adopting a requirement that a felony underlying a 
felony murder charge involve conduct independent of the act that re-
sulted in the homicide would also go a long way towards ensuring that 
felony murder liability is justly applied.  Such a limitation would prec-
lude felony murder liability in classic Shaken Baby Syndrome cases. 
Once classic Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths are removed from the 
ambit of felony murder, the General Assembly should consider how to 
treat such cases.  The circumstances inherent in Shaken Baby Syndrome 
cases may demand harsher treatment of analogous homicides that do not 
involve children.155  However, the appropriate treatment of Shaken Baby 
Syndrome cases presents a normative choice best left to the collective 
judgment of the North Carolinian people, as expressed through their 
representatives in the General Assembly. 
In the absence of any legal reform along these lines, North Caroli-
na’s prosecutors must exercise special vigilance and sound discretion.  
 
 152. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 153. See id. 
 154. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 155. This demand for a harsher punishment has already been addressed in North 
Carolina’s structured sentencing provisions, which lists as an aggravating factor that “the 
victim was very young, or very old, or mentally or physically infirm, or handicapped.”  
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1340.16(11)(d) (2011). 
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They must recognize that were they to uniformly apply felony murder 
liability in all Shaken Baby Syndrome cases they would not necessarily 
act in accordance with the General Assembly’s considered policy choic-
es.  Prosecutors should therefore investigate the circumstances sur-
rounding Shaken Baby Syndrome deaths thoroughly and bring only 
charges that serve the interests of justice in the particular case. 
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